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ABSTRACT
We examine the politics of the “Salary Grab” of 1873, legislation that increased congressional
salaries retroactively by 50 percent. A group of New England and Midwestern elites opposed the
Salary Grab, along with congressional franking and patronage-based civil service appointments, as
part of reform effort to reshape “who should govern Congress.” Our analyses of congressional voting
confirm the existence of this non-party elite coalition. While these elites lost many legislative battles
in the short-run, their efforts kept reform on the legislative agenda throughout the late-nineteenth
century and ultimately set the stage for the Progressive movement in the early-twentieth century.
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I. Introduction 
 
On March 3, 1873, the last day of the 42nd Congress, the congressional membership 
voted itself a 50 percent pay increase, from $5,000 to $7,500 per annum, which was also made 
retroactive to the first day of the Congress.  At the time of the vote, a significant number of 
members were lame ducks, or non-returning, which meant that they would be exiting the 
chamber with a $5,000 going-away present.  The press characterized the pay raise as the “Salary 
Grab,” and many newspapers connected it to the recent Crédit Mobilier scandal in charging the 
governing Republican majority in Congress with perpetuating a climate of corruption.  These 
charges would take their toll, as the Republicans would go on to suffer heavy losses in the state 
elections of 1873.  Moreover, the public backlash against the Grab was so intense and lasting that 
Congress acted to rescind the salary increase at the beginning of the following (43rd) Congress. 
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of congressional voting on the Salary Grab.  
The historical literature echoes the reporting of the time, suggesting that the passage of the Grab 
was a function of Republican arrogance combined with lame duck greed.  We show, however, 
that Republicans and lame ducks were no more likely to support the salary increase than 
Democrats or returning members of Congress.  We posit, instead, that voting on the Salary Grab 
was part of a larger storyline of political reform that developed during the 1870s and stretched 
into the Progressive Era.  Specifically, we argue that a reform coalition emerged during the 42nd 
Congress, coalescing around a series of “good government” issues, such as opposition to the 
Salary Grab.  While history has been kinder to the rhetorical strategies of this good government 
coalition, proponents of the salary increase also used the rhetoric of reform, arguing that raising 
salaries would democratize government by lowering the barriers to entry to Congress and acting 
as an efficiency wage.   2 
We argue that the Salary Grab constituted a major legislative battle that served as an 
early focal point in the decades-long war between the forces for “good government” and 
advocates of patronage-based machine politics.  In analyzing the politics of the Salary Grab and 
the good government coalition that emerged around the Grab and related issues in the 42nd 
Congress (1871-73), we shed new light on the history of the Progressive movement by focusing 
on its beginnings, a stage of the movement’s development that has received relatively little 
attention by historians and social scientists.  In doing so, we lay the foundation for a 
comprehensive reevaluation of the tenets of “progressive reform” and the various reform-based 
coalitions that emerged during the Progressive Era. 
Most scholars of Progressive Era politics focus on events during the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, most notably the period spanning Theodore Roosevelt’s Presidency; thus, they 
do not trace the groups advocating reform back to their beginnings.  Part of the difficulty in 
determining the origins of the Progressive Movement is that it comprised an amalgam of reform 
agendas – ranging from the control of big business to the control of personal behavior – that 
were advocated by a mix of interest groups in the early-twentieth century.  From our twenty-first 
century perspective, many of the Progressive Era reforms seem contradictory.  For instance, 
expanding political rights through women’s suffrage constituted a major success of the 
Progressive Movement, as it allowed for greater equality between the sexes.  However, limiting 
political rights through literacy requirements was also viewed as progressive because it limited 
immigrants’ electoral impact and their ability to participate in patronage-based machine-style 
politics, which was often tied directly to the rising corruption in government after the Civil War.
1 
                                                 
1 See Keyssar (2000: 119-29) for an overview of the suffrage restrictions adopted in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.   3 
To understand the many impulses behind the Progressive Movement, the origins of its 
constituent groups need to be carefully uncovered.  We focus on the early postbellum political 
activity of one such group, the displaced traditional elite.  Doing so expands on the work of 
Hofstadter (1955), who argues that the leadership of the Progressive Movement consisted of 
these traditional elites – the established civic leaders from the Northeast and Midwest – who 
were dismayed by the appearance of a new industrial class and who failed to maintain a central 
role in politics as patronage-based mass parties grew in importance.
2  These New England and 
Midwestern elites were especially concerned about the shape of Congress and believed that 
elected representatives should serve out of a sense of noblesse oblige.  They found the increasing 
reports of corruption in government especially disconcerting, particularly the corruption 
associated with urban-based machine politics.  In response, they sought to clean up government 
by limiting “access to power” – that is, limiting who could serve in governmental positions – and 
opposing the Salary Grab in order to keep salaries low was a key issue in their agenda. 
While this elite coalition of the early 1870s failed initially in its twin objectives of 
cleaning up the national political scene and creating a true “reform party,” it succeeded by 
helping to establish a viable reform element within the Republican Party and national party 
politics more generally, which set the stage for later legislative victories such as the Pendleton 
Act in 1883, which initiated merit-based civil service, and state-level secret ballot initiatives in 
the late-1880s and early-1890s, which protected voters’ identities and facilitated split-ticket 
voting.  These legislative victories undercut the machine-politics that defined party organizations 
                                                 
2 In contrast to Hosfstadter, Wiebe (1967) argues that the Progressive Movement found its 
support in the middle class, which sought to manage society with greater efficiency.  
Alternatively, Fogel (2000) points to the importance of religious awakenings and their impact on 
political outcomes regulating personal behavior.     4 
after the Civil War and presaged later political developments, like the emergence of primary 
elections and the direct election of Senators, during the early-twentieth century.   
 
II. Congressional Pay and the “Salary Grab” 
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the “Founders” spent a considerable amount of 
time debating broad institutional reforms to deal with the myriad of collective-action problems 
that emerged under the Articles of Confederation.  The Founders also found time to discuss more 
pragmatic political issues, like the “nuts and bolts” that would allow government to operate on a 
daily basis.  One such issue was how to determine the pay of members of Congress.  Eventually, 
they decided to place the duty of setting congressional salaries directly in the hands of Congress 
itself.
3   
This sensitive duty was a double-edged sword for members: they could make their 
positions more lucrative, but not without running the risk of upsetting their constituents.  Case in 
point was the Compensation Act of 1816, which raised salaries from $6 per day to $1,500 per 
year.
4  This sparked a significant constituent backlash, and, as a result, a majority of members 
were voted out of office (see Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson 1996).
5  To protect themselves from 
this sort of constituent reaction, members of Congress throughout the nineteenth century used a 
host of techniques to reduce transparency and hide blame, such as improving and enhancing non-
                                                 
3 See Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution: “The Senators and Representatives shall receive a 
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States.” 
4 This $6 per diem was first established in 1789, during the First Congress (1 Statutes at Large 
70-71; September 22, 1789).  Members worked an average of 150 days per year during this era, 
which converted to an annual wage of around $900. 
5 The pay raise was eventually repealed in 1817, in the lame-duck session of the same Congress 
that initially passed it (3 Statutes at Large 345; February 6, 1817).  In 1818, the per diem of $6 a 
day was increased to $8 a day (3 Statutes at Large 404; January 22, 1818), where it stood until 
1856, when an annual salary of $3,000 was instituted (11 Statutes at Large 48; August 16, 1856).   5 
salary perquisites, like mileage reimbursement rates, franking, congressional staff, and retirement 
benefits (see, e.g., Fisher 1980), or passing a smaller salary increase but “backdating” it.  The 
latter technique was often used in the nineteenth century:  for example, the pay increase from $8 
per day to $3,000 per year in 1856 was backdated 11 months, while the pay increase to $5,000 in 
1865 was backdated 16 months.  
On the whole, members of Congress in the nineteenth century enjoyed few of the 
perquisites that we associate with their contemporary counterparts.  While they had the ability to 
send mail to constituents free of charge (i.e., the “franking privilege”), members were not 
provided with any organizational benefits, like a professional staff.  If a member of Congress 
circa 1870 chose to employ any personal clerks or administrators, he had to pay them directly out 
of his $5,000 salary.
6  For members who were not independently wealthy, this often meant 
financial hardship, as Washington was an expensive city in which to live.  For example, by 1853, 
the salaries of simple federal administrative clerks (albeit in the upper level) reached $2,200 per 
year, an amount viewed by many at the time as inadequate (White 1954: 380-82).  As a result, in 
early 1873, it was not at all unusual for a member of Congress, earning $5,000 per year, to have 
difficulty adequately clothing and feeding his family, providing a private education for his 
children, paying a sizeable rent within the capitol limits, and participating in the requisite social 
morays (such as hosting private dinner parties) of the time.   
To stay afloat while living in Washington, many members of Congress pursued a second 
occupation on the side, to maintain an auxiliary source of income (Fisher 1980: 34).  Typically, 
they would continue their pre-Congress professions back in their districts, usually during the 
                                                 
6 The lone exception involved standing committee chairmen, who were provided with an aide 
(and office space) at federal expense.  This explains, in part, the expansion in the number of 
standing committees after the Civil War, many of which dealt with mundane matters and rarely 
(if ever) actually met.   6 
considerable time-off between congressional sessions.  However, they also increasingly turned to 
the many individuals and firms that began lobbying Congress during and after the Civil War.
7  
The incentive to act corruptly due to inadequate pay may have contributed to the congressional 
scandals of the time, such as Crédit Mobilier.  
The legislation that became known as the Salary Grab originated in the waning days of 
the 42nd Congress, amid the normal course of congressional business.
8  The possibility of 
increasing members’ salaries was first raised on February 7, in the House Judiciary Committee, 
which was chaired by Benjamin Butler (R-MA).  Butler appended the pay increase to the general 
appropriations bill so that members would not be required to vote on the increase as a separate 
bill.  The amendment stipulated that the President’s annual salary, which had remained 
unchanged since the days of George Washington, would double to $50,000, the annual salaries 
of Supreme Court Judges and Cabinet Officers would be raised to $10,000, and the salaries of 
many civil servants – a key component of the patronage system – would also increase.  In 
addition, members of Congress would receive a pay hike of 50 percent, from $5,000 to $7,500 
per annum, which would be retroactive to the beginning of the 42nd Congress, almost two full 
years earlier; in other words, all members of Congress would receive a lump sum payment of 
approximately $5,000 for “services rendered” upon the close of the session.  On February 10, 
                                                 
7 The Civil War was the first time that there was sufficient money at the federal level such that 
lobbying and graft arose. Prior to this period, the majority of allegations concerning corruption in 
government transpired at the state level.  
8 While we discuss portions of both House and Senate debates on the salary increase, we will 
focus specifically on the House votes in our narrative and regressions. This is because there was 
a greater electoral connection between constituents and House members at this time: House 
members were elected directly by district-level voters, while Senators were only indirectly 
elected, chosen instead by state legislatures.     7 
Butler offered his amendment, the initial Salary Grab vote (RC 446), on the House floor.
9  It 
failed 81-119, Republicans voting 38-74 and Democrats voting 43-45 (Congressional Globe, 42-
3, 2/10/1873, p. 1234).
10 
On February 24, 1873, the House convened to conduct the routine procedure of 
hammering out a legislative appropriations bill.  As the membership debated technical 
provisions, Butler again proposed an amendment to increase the salaries of several government 
officials.  On February 28, this bill (RC 506) was defeated 69-121, Republicans voting 40-77 and 
Democrats voting 29-44; however, the vote to reconsider and adjourn (RC 507) – essentially 
keeping the salary bill alive – was passed 114-61, Republicans voting 62-49 and Democrats 
voting 52-12 (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 2/28/1873, p. 1926). 
The next day, March 1, brought three roll calls. The first (RC 508) was a motion to table 
the Salary Grab, offered by John Farnsworth (R-IL), which was defeated 66-105, Republicans 
voting 48-59 and Democrats voting 18-46.  If this tabling motion had passed, the debate over the 
salary increase would have been over.  The next roll call (RC 509) was a motion offered by 
Butler to reconsider the Salary Grab legislation, which passed 105-79, Republicans voting 57-52 
and Democrats voting 48-27.  The final roll call (RC 510) was a motion made by James Garfield 
(R-OH) to accept a Senate amendment that stipulated a smaller salary increase for members of 
Congress, from $5,000 to $6,500, while eliminating allowances for mileage, newspapers, and 
stationary.  If passed, the amendment would be would tacked on to the legislative appropriations 
bill, which would then be sent to conference committee, where it could be further modified 
                                                 
9 Throughout the paper we will refer to the roll calls by their Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) codes. 
10 The Congressional Globe was a roughly verbatim account of the congressional proceedings.  
In terms of notation, each reference to the Globe will be followed by: Congress-Session, date, 
and page number of the debate or vote.   8 
before a final bill was reported back to each chamber.  This scaled-back salary increase passed 
100-97, Republicans voting 52-62 and Democrats voting 48-35 (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 
3/1/1873, p. 1977). 
A stacked conference committee included Butler and Matthew Carpenter (R-WI), who 
sponsored the pay raise legislation in the Senate.  After much internal wrangling, the conference 
committee reported a bill out on March 3, the final day of the Congress, which effectively 
mirrored the original proposal by Butler, reinstituting the $2,500 congressional pay raise.
11  It 
appeared that the scaled-back salary increase had been a ruse perpetrated by Butler and 
Carpenter, simply to get the legislation to conference committee where they could revise it back 
to their preferred levels.  With only a few hours before adjournment, the House considered two 
more votes relevant to the Salary Grab.  The first was a motion to order the main question on the 
conference report (RC 515) and the second was to vote on the conference report (RC 516).  
These final two roll calls were on the entire appropriations bill, so voting on them may not reflect 
strict preferences over the Salary Grab.  Both chambers acted quickly and passed the conference 
bill – the House 102-95, Republicans voting 57-62 and Democrats voting 45-33, and the Senate 
36-27, Republicans voting 26-22 and Democrats voting 10-5 (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 
3/3/1873, pp. 2105, 2184) – and President Grant signed it into law.
12 
                                                 
11 Peskin (1978: 365-66) claims that five of the six members of the conference committee 
supported Butler’s salary proposal.  Only James Garfield, the chairman of the House 
Appropriations committee, opposed the initiative.  Garfield eventually acquiesced after several 
hours of tense discussions, because of two factors: (1) he was able to persuade the committee to 
eliminate a mileage stipulation in the plan, which would save the Treasury around $200,000, and 
(2) he feared that voting down the appropriations bill would force a special session of Congress, 
which would open up a new set of potential problems for the Republicans. 
12 See Robinson (1873), Rhodes (1906), Peskin (1978), and Thompson (1985) for further 
accounts of these proceedings.   9 
The proposed increase in congressional salaries, though coupled with proposed increases 
for other governmental officials, was controversial throughout the various proceedings and votes.  
Congress was still reeling from the Crédit Mobilier scandal, leading many members to caution 
against any actions – like a congressional pay raise – that might further “stir the pot” as the 
congressional session came to an end.  In addition, the proposed pay raise was offered as an 
amendment to an appropriations bill, rather than as a separate bill, leading some members to 
worry that the public might view the increase as a “backdoor” attempt and yet another example 
of governmental corruption.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the pay raise amendment 
was considered in the “lame duck” (or “short”) session of Congress, when nearly 50 percent of 
the House membership was in its final days.
13   The retroactive element of the pay raise meant 
that the lame duck members, who retained their voting privileges, walked away with an 
additional $5,000 “free and clear” at the conclusion of their tenure, a clear conflict of interest. 
To the chagrin of Butler and his supporters, the congressional pay raise prompted a 
public outcry.  While some newspapers, like the Titusville Morning Herald, initially claimed that 
the salary increase was “reasonable enough,” and that a “liberal salary will leave the field of 
competition open to poor men as well as rich, to the man of brains, as well as to the owner of 
dollars, to the lawyer as well as the banker” (March 5, 1873, p. 2, c. 1), the tide of public opinion 
turned quickly once the retroactive element was widely understood.  Democratic and Republican 
papers alike condemned the move.  For example, the Defiance Democrat opined that “This is a 
bold, defiant, flagrant robbery, particularly that portion of the law that is retroactive” (March 15, 
1873, p. 1, c. 2).  And the Grand Traverse Herald – a Republican paper – remarked that “This 
                                                 
13 Lame ducks comprised 114 of 243 members in the House and 16 of 74 members in the Senate. 
Prior to the passage of the 20th Amendment in 1933, elections to the subsequent Congress took 
place prior to the short session of the current Congress, resulting in a legislative environment in 
which lame duck (or non-returning) members were freed from electoral accountability.     10 
knavish trick will be remembered against every man who supported it… [H]e can never again 
get office or honor among honest men” (March 27, 1873, p. 1, c. 3).  
The Salary Grab, as described by newspaper reports, was an “easy” issue, one that could 
be processed at the gut level by all citizens regardless of their degree of sophistication or 
attentiveness to politics.
14  As Josephson (1938: 186) details: “Puzzled by the charges and 
countercharges of the Crédit Mobilier episode, the honest yeomanry of the nation grasped 
clearly, however, the meaning of the ‘back-pay’ steal.”
15  As a result, a wave of indignation 
swept the country which, in combination with the beginnings of a serious economic depression, 
led to an electoral backlash against the governing Republican Party in the state elections of 1873, 
with many state legislatures falling into Democratic hands for the first time since before the Civil 
War.  Attempting to repair the damage, the Republican leadership back-pedaled on the salary 
increase upon the opening of the 43rd Congress in December 1873.  This time around, the debate 
was lengthy and the newspaper editorializing heavy.  Butler, Carpenter, and their allies fought 
hard to keep the pay raise or, at most, limit the reduction in pay to $6,500.  However, on January 
20, 1874, Congress officially repealed the entire congressional pay raise,
16 sustaining only the 
salary increases for the President and Supreme Court Justices (18 Statutes at Large 4).
17  
 
III. History and Hypotheses 
The historical literature proposes several hypotheses to explain the passage of the Salary 
Grab.  Dunning (1907) and Josephson (1938) paint it as a wholly Republican initiative, resulting 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of “easy” versus “hard” issues, see Carmines and Stimson (1980). 
15 See Rhodes (1906) and Fisher (1980) for similar arguments. 
16 Recipients of the retroactive salary payment in the 42nd Congress were not forced to repay any 
monies, but many in fact chose to do so.  The political costs of not repaying the retroactive “gift” 
were considerable for some members. 
17 Both Butler and Carpenter continued to defend their support for the Salary Grab, but the public 
was unconvinced by their arguments. Both lost their bids for reelection to the 44th
 Congress.   11 
from the arrogance of a large and seemingly insurmountable partisan majority in place since the 
Civil War.  Peskin (1978) and Thompson (1985) conclude that most of the bill’s support came 
from lame-duck members who were enticed by the sizeable retroactive benefits and the absence 
of an electoral cost.  Theriault (2002) claims that the critical support came from southern 
Republicans, who foresaw the end of Reconstruction and the return of a Democratic South and 
chose to land with their $5,000 “golden parachute.”   
We find little empirical evidence to support these hypotheses.  Looking at the final Salary 
Grab vote on March 3, the Republicans were nearly split in both the House and Senate.  In the 
House, 61 Republicans voted in favor of the salary increase and 56 against, while in the Senate, 
26 voted in favor and 21 against. The lame duck hypothesis finds minimal empirical support, as 
well.
18  In the House, 53 lame ducks favored the salary increase while 40 opposed it.  In the 
Senate, there is a bit more support, as 10 lame duck members voted for the increase and 2 
against.  Moreover, both southern Republicans and southern Democrats voted nearly 
unanimously for the Salary Grab.  Our conclusion, then, is that there was a regional effect, 
though very limited party or lame duck effects, in the vote.  
                                                 
18 While the lame duck argument seems quite reasonable on its face, given that exiting members 
of Congress should plausibly have different incentives (i.e., more self-interested incentives) once 
the “electoral connection” is severed, recent work on congressional voting behavior uncovers 
little evidence to support the argument.  Rather, most scholars find that members of Congress 
“die in their ideological boots.” That is, according to Poole (2003: 3), “based upon the roll-call 
voting record, once elected to Congress, members adopt an ideological position and maintain 
that position throughout their careers — once a liberal or a conservative or a moderate, always a 
liberal or a conservative or a moderate.”  This finding holds not only for members of the 
contemporary Congress, but also for members from bygone eras; members exhibit high levels of 
individual-level ideological stability across nearly all of U.S. history (see Poole and Rosenthal 
1997).  Specifically, members’ voting records remain essentially the same, regardless of whether 
they plan to retire from the House (Lott 1987; Van Beek 1991; Lott and Bronars 1993; Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997), plan to run for a higher office (Hibbing 1986; Poole and Romer 1993), serve in 
a higher office (Grofman, Griffin, and Berry 1995; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), or have their 
districts redrawn (Poole and Romer 1993; Poole 2003).  The first two categories of evidence 
relate directly to the lame duck argument, suggesting that there are in fact no “last term” effects.   12 
Theriault (2004) provides a more general framework in which to study congressional pay 
raises, arguing that such increases “perhaps better than any other issue, pit members’ personal 
interests against their constituents’ preferences” (444).  That is, members want higher salaries, 
while their constituents prefer them to have lower salaries.  There is little doubt that, all else 
equal, members of Congress prefer more money to less.  However, changing congressional pay 
not only changes the salary of an individual member, but also alters the membership of Congress 
and the types of actions members take once in office.  From a contractual perspective, changing 
congressional pay alters both the selection problem – who will run and ultimately win a seat in 
Congress – and the incentive problem – how the winner will act once elected.  
During the debates on the proposed salary increase in 1873, members offered a series of 
sophisticated economic rationales concerning how a pay raise would affect their selection and 
incentives.  Arguments were made by two competing camps, but these arguments were not 
correlated with the dominant left-right cleavage in congressional politics.  On one side was a 
group of elite reformers, with a core allegiance in New England and the Midwest, while on the 
other side was a set of seasoned machine politicians in the Mid Atlantic and South.  The elite 
reformers wanted to maintain the monetary entry barriers to Congress, preserving its exclusive 
and paternalistic status.  The machine politicians wanted to broaden the representation of 




After the Civil War and into the early-1870s, the Republican Party was run by the 
“Stalwarts,” a group close to the Grant Administration, who favored patronage-based, machine-
style politics and supported a “crony” Republican regime in the Reconstructed South.  Best 
known among the Stalwarts were Butler, Carpenter, and Roscoe Conkling (R-NY).  Their   13 
principle rivals were the “Half Breeds,” moderate Republicans led by James Blaine (R-ME) who 
were less tied to patronage politics, favored the end of Reconstruction, and worked to tie the 
party more closely to the growing industrial interests that emerged after the Civil War.  There 
was typically a half-hearted reform element within the Half Breed organization, but only when it 
was politically expedient.  A third, smaller group of “Liberal Reformers” often proved to be 
pivotal within the Republican organization.  Led by men like Charles Sumner (R-MA), George 
Frisbie Hoar (R-MA) and Carl Schurz (R-MO), this group broke away from the Republican 
Party twice: once in 1872 to form the Liberal Republican party, which was a dismal failure,
19 and 
again in 1884 – when they were known as the Mugwumps – to support Democrat Grover 
Cleveland for president.  Their goal was to reorient the governing structure, and they used their 
political leverage to keep issues like civil service reform on the political agenda throughout the 
1870s and into the 1880s. 
In terms of political decision-making, the Liberal Reformers believed that the common 
people were often unfit to rule; as such, they wanted to raise voting qualifications and favored 
the rich, educated, and wellborn as government leaders.  Hofstadter (1955) describes them as:  
the old gentry, the merchants of long standing, the small manufacturers, the 
established professional men, the civic leaders of an earlier era … the old-family, 
college-educated class that had deep ancestral roots in local communities and 
often owned family businesses, that had traditions of political leadership, 
                                                 
19 In 1872, the reformers tired of the Grant Administration and broke away from the Republicans 
to form the Liberal Republican party (Ross 1917).  In March 1872, they held their nominating 
convention in Cincinnati, with the explicit goal of removing Grant and his allies from office and 
replacing them with liberal reformers.  They were unable, however, to advance a liberal 
platform, as the convention attracted a mix of Republican dissidents with contradictory 
preferences – free traders and protectionists, civil service reformers and spoilsmen, and 
advocates of “Negro rights” and Southern redeemers all attended (Sproat 1968: 6).  In the end, 
leaders in the liberal movement were passed over in favor of Horace Greeley, the editor of the 
New York Tribune, a man of conflicting visions.  The Democrats also endorsed Greeley, further 
muddying the intended liberal message.  Greeley won only 43.8 percent of popular vote and 
carried just six states: Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas.   14 
belonged to the patriotic societies and the best clubs, staffed the governing boards 
of philanthropic and cultural institutions, and led the movements for civic 
betterment (137). 
 
These Liberal Reformers generally lived in urban areas, in the Northeast and Midwest.  
They normally attended private secondary schools and prestigious colleges and universities.  
They were typically wealthy, often inheriting their wealth and maintaining it via trades such as 
banking or the law, and were less likely to have fought in the Civil War, both because they could 
afford to buy their way out and because they were tied through their financial and business 
activities to the economy of the South.  Coming from a higher social status, they were less likely 
to have moved from their home state, having an established network on which they could build 
their careers.  Few industrialists would fit the bill; in fact, the “newly rich, the grandiosely or 
corruptly rich, the masters of great corporations” were the source of Mugwump dismay 
(Hofstadter 1955: 137). 
Politics during the Grant Administration stoked the ire of the Liberal Reformers, in part 
because there was more money and power over which to fight.  They believed the Republicans 
under Grant abused patronage, filling civil service positions with unqualified friends rather than 
skilled administrators; propped up illegitimate carpetbag and scalawag governments in the 
Reconstructed South, while denying the vote to many leading white Southerners; and tied 
themselves too closely to the emerging “Lords of Industry,” subsidizing the “robber barons” and 
opening up the party to frequent opportunities for vice.  The Liberal Reformers quickly cited the 
Salary Grab as yet another example of the Republicans’ moral decline and corruption (Torok 
1991: 292). 
The Liberal Reformers had a fairly straightforward agenda with simple solutions to 
governmental problems.  As Sproat (1968: 6) notes: “For the abuses that offended them they   15 
proposed the simple remedies of ‘good government,’ economic orthodoxy, and moral 
rejuvenation.  Put ‘good men’ into positions of responsibility and power, they urged.”  What 
government needed, in other words, was an influx of the “best” elements in society – men such 
as themselves, intellectuals who were steeped in the professional and financial worlds who strove 
to foster competition and increase efficiency.  Once in power, they would eschew machine 
politics and bossism in favor of administrative/technical talents and meritorious rewards.  They 
would not be corrupt or corruptible, and they would guide the nation with a paternalistic hand.   
Despite their failure to spark a “reform revolution” in 1872, the Liberal Reformers made 
inroads in the public consciousness, thanks in part to a growing list of liberal newspaper editors 
of the time, such as E. L. Godkin of the Nation, George William Curtis of Harper’s Weekly, 
George Eliot Norton of the North American Review, Horace White of the Chicago Tribune, and 
Murat Halstead of the Cincinnati Commercial.  Under these liberal editors, charges of graft and 
corruption in local, state, and national politics became almost ubiquitous, resulting in a growing 
public distrust of government and ever louder calls for reform.
20   
Republican Stalwarts were typically the targets of the Liberal Reformers’ attacks, and 
Benjamin Butler and Matthew Carpenter, the leaders of the Salary Grab in the House and Senate, 
respectively, took much of the heat due to their general willingness to provide public justification 
for their positions.  Butler, in particular, was viewed as “earthy, Anglophobic, egalitarian, 
combative, unimpressed by their assertions of noblesse oblige, and possessed of a vast popular 
following which the [Liberal Reformers] regarded as unscrupulously obtained and properly their 
                                                 
20 At this time, newspapers were heavily partisan and ideologically biased in their coverage of 
persons and events.  Between 1870 and 1920, as corruption in government declined, the press 
became less partisan (and ideological) and more informative.  For an overview of the rise of the 
informative press, see Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin (2006).   16 
own” (Thompson 1982: 167).  In the eyes of the reformers, “Butlerism” became synonymous 
with “the transfer of power to the ignorant and the poor” (Sproat 1968: 48-49). 
Prior to entering the military, Butler was a successful criminal defense lawyer.  He had a 
keen understanding of the law and of the rules of Congress, which allowed him to shepherd the 
Salary Grab bill through the House against considerable opposition.  During the Civil War, 
Butler used his political influence to obtain his general’s stars, and he infamously commanded 
the occupation of New Orleans for eight months.  Hearn (1997) summarizes Butler’s class 
politics in New Orleans: 
Secessionists among the upper class bitterly resented him…The elite and the 
literate, accustomed to having their way, attempted to use their wealth and 
influence to destroy the general…The huge, illiterate majority—the poorer classes 
of blacks and whites—would have starved had Butler not fed and employed them, 
and thousands may have died had his sanitation policies not cleansed the city of 
disease. For many years after the war the poor continued to praise him, but all the 
admirable aspects of Butler’s administration were clouded by constant 
accusations of rampant corruption (4). 
 
Butler described his political philosophy in the following way: 
As to the powers and duties of the government of the United States, I am a 
Hamiltonian Federalist. As to the rights and privileges of the citizens, I am a 
Jeffersonian Democrat. I hold that the full and only end of government is to care 
for the people in their rights and liberties, and that that they have the right and 
privilege to call on either the State or the United States, or both, to protect them in 
equality of powers, equality of rights, equality of privileges, and equality of 
burdens under the law, by carefully and energetically enforced provisions of equal 
laws justly applicable to every citizen. (Quoted in Nash 1969: 18) 
 
While he changed his positions and “political stripes” quite frequently – switching parties six 
times during his career – Butler’s sympathies were always with the common man, supporting 
equal rights for blacks, pro-labor legislation, inflationary measures, and women’s suffrage.  
Matthew Carpenter shared many of Butler’s political views, and was also a skilled 
tactician and accomplished debater.  While his political machine was not as extensive as   17 
Butler’s,
21 Carpenter was the more famous lawyer, having argued a total of ninety-seven cases 
before the Supreme Court.  Carpenter switched parties during the Civil War, but he always 
remained a Jeffersonian Democrat in his inclinations.  He was not a populist champion, but his 
politics included woman’s suffrage, a narrow interpretation of the Constitution, regulation of 
railroads and monopolies, coeducation of blacks and whites, Chinese rights, and – when he 
thought it was what his constituents desired – inflationary monetary policies (Thompson 1954).  
 
Selection and Incentives 
 
Three arguments concerning the shape and actions of Congress were made during the 
debates over the Salary Grab. The first two concerned the shape of Congress while the third 
concerned the incentives of members.
22  
The first argument was that higher salaries would induce individuals to enter Congress 
simply for the monetary benefit.  That is, rather than encouraging individuals to serve out of a 
sense of noblesse oblige, raising salaries would attract candidates with more pecuniary motives.  
George Frisbie Hoar (R-MA), Butler’s leading opponent in the House, argued that a generous 
compensation package was not necessary for public servants:  
I have been long of the opinion there are some classes of public servants which 
must derive compensation from conscientious discharge of public duty. There is a 
difference between the salary and the work. The judge, the clergyman, the 
teacher, the legislator, after you have reached the limits of a simple frugal 
livelihood, every increase in compensation makes the office an object of desire to 
men who seek it for that compensation mostly (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 
2/24/1873, p. 1676).  
 
                                                 
21 See Mallam (1960) for a description of Butler’s political machine. 
22 The selection arguments generally divided the Liberal Reformers and the Stalwarts, but the 
dividing line was by no means clean. For instance, House (1965) argues that Michael Kerr (D-
IN) bested Samuel Randall (D-PA) in the election for House Speaker in 1875 in part because 
Kerr former voted against the Salary Grab while Randall voted for it. 
   18 
Justin Morrill (R-VT) argued similarly that, “When it shall degenerate to this, that men come 
here to obtain a higher compensation than they can secure at home, it seems to me that the 
service that will be rendered will be unlikely to bear a favorable comparison with the past” 
(Congressional Globe, 42-3, 3/1/1873, p. 2049).  Later in the debates Morrill more clearly 
revealed his preference for members with a sense of noblesse oblige by stating that, “I do not 
believe in turning our services here into a mere pecuniary reward.  They should not be paid for in 
full in money. There ought to be some compensation left in the honor of the position of Senator 
or Representative” (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 3/3/1873, p. 2180).  William Niblack (D-IN), 
Clarkson Potter (D-NY), and John Scott (R-PA) echoed Morrill and Hoar’s arguments. 
The second argument concerning the shape of Congress was that low salaries only 
allowed rich men to serve.  Raising salaries, from this perspective, was democratic; it would 
increase opportunities by allowing poor but qualified men to serve in Congress.  It would also 
compensate those men with a higher opportunity cost of their time.  Carpenter pushed this line of 
argument most forcefully:  
The real question is whether poor men shall be allowed to participate in the 
administration of the Government. Rich men are all opposed to increasing 
salaries. That is after their kind. They would abolish salaries altogether if they 
could, and then only rich men could hold the offices. They would be quite willing 
to take and administer this Government, make its laws, fill the bench, and take 
care of the people without a cent of salary. Take a Senator worth his million or 
two, what does he care whether the pay of a Senator is five or ten thousand 
dollars. The difference would not make a ripple on his bank account; but it would 
settle the question with a poor man whether he could be a Senator or not … [T]o 
pass a law saying no man shall be a judge or a Senator unless he has property 
yielding an income of five or ten thousand dollars a year, would cause a 
revolution. But what is the difference between such a law and one fixing the 
salaries of all these offices so low that a man cannot hold the office unless he has 
a private fortune? … Increase the pay of members of Congress so as to pay the 
reasonable expense of living and a fair compensation for the labor we perform 
and you open Congress to brains. Reduce the pay and you open it to men of 
wealth. Men will fill these seats not for what they are, but for what they have. 
(Congressional Globe, 42-3, 3/1/1873, p. 2045)   19 
 
James Nye (R-NV), Thomas Bayard (D-DE), and Nathaniel Banks (R-MA) echoed the argument 
that low salaries would allow only rich men to serve in Congress.  Carpenter acknowledged that 
a poor man could run for Congress and live in Washington, but he argued that the inability to 
live in a way that the rich do would marginalize the poor.  
[W]e “white trash” must live on a scale entirely below the nabobs of the Senate. 
Well, Mr. President, it does not require any genius to see and know that if you 
make these discriminations in social life, of necessity you force just such 
discrimination upon the influence of men in this body. There is great sublimity 
undoubtedly in the idea of rising above all the accidents of human nature, looking 
at things in the abstract, and regarding a man dressed in goat skins precisely as 
one dressed like a gentleman; but unfortunately the sentiment is not respected in 
practical life (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 3/3/1873, p. 2181). 
 
Butler, like Carpenter, repeatedly used class-based arguments, often making reference to 
a member’s familial burdens and quality of life.  To Butler, a member of Congress “ought to live 
as he does at home and receive enough to pay his family expenses and to educate his children.  
Now, that cannot be done on less than $7,500.  I am certain every man here ought to have his 
living expense, and that is my experience of the cost of living here” (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 
2/24/1873, p. 1676).  According to Butler’s line of reasoning, a low salary did not properly 
compensate a member for his efforts, and only by raising salaries could men with a higher 
opportunity cost of their time be attracted to serve.  
The third and final argument concerned the actions of members once elected.  Supporters 
of the pay raise portrayed it as a reform measure, something that would change the actions of 
members by acting as an “efficiency wage,” to combat the many outside lures of corruption.  
Carpenter led the way again in the Senate, reciting from the Lord’s Prayer:  
I tell you, Mr. President, that [raising salaries] is the true reformation for our 
service; that this would reform it and cure the abuses. ‘Lead us not into 
temptation’ is our prayer. ‘Lead us not into temptation’ should be the end which 
our laws should have in view; and members of Congress, members of the cabinet,   20 
everybody who serves this great people should be compensated for such service 
(Congressional Globe, 42-3, 3/3/1873, p. 2181). 
 
Samuel Randall (D-PA) echoed Carpenter’s logic, arguing that “if you will put members 
of Congress beyond temptation by giving them an adequate salary, you will pass fewer subsidy 
bills” (Congressional Globe, 42-3, 3/1/1873, p. 2051).  Butler also argued that paying a flat 
salary, without the mal-incentives associated with franking and travel allowances, would act as a 
reform measure. “True economy in this matter is that members shall feel first that they are not 
supposed to have what are sometimes called ‘pickings and stealings,’ pay and allowances; but an 
open, fair salary, known to all the world, and every many may know exactly what that salary is” 
(Congressional Globe, 42-3, 3/3/1873, p. 2103).  Nye echoed the anti-corruption argument for 
raising wages: “[P]ut the man that serves his country faithfully above the necessities of want and 
you will get honest men; but to pinch him and watch him on every corner, is to make the virtuous 




We contend that the congressional pay raise was part of an ongoing ideological battle 
over access to political power.  If the Salary Grab truly tapped into ideological divisions, we 
would expect to see evidence of this in congressional voting patterns in the 42nd Congress.  For 
example, we should observe a correlation between voting on the Salary Grab and voting on 
similar issues of ideological disagreement.  To explore this, we compare the vote on the Salary 
Grab with votes on civil service reform and the abolition of the franking privilege.  In addition, 
we expect that the personal characteristics of members played a significant role in how they 
voted.  Specifically, members with characteristics associated with the Liberal Reformers should 
be more likely to vote against the Salary Grab.   21 
IV. Civil Service Reform and Franking 
 
To make the case that a battle over “who should govern” emerged in the 42nd Congress, 
we move beyond a narrow examination of the Salary Grab and pursue evidence that the “access 
to power” rhetoric was used on other, similar issues.  Examining the proceedings of the 42nd 
Congress, we find several issues on the legislative agenda that could be characterized as 
“reform” measures and also had an impact on who could serve in government.  This section 
examines two such measures, civil service reform and the elimination of franking, and provides 
evidence that congressional voting on these issues and the Salary Grab were correlated. 
 
Civil Service Reform 
 
On the last day of the 41st Congress, Congress passed a bill giving the President the 
power to form a civil service commission.  In June 1871, Grant appointed such a commission.  
Hoogenboom (1961) describes the early proponents of civil service reform as elite New 
Englanders.
23  The spoilsmen of the day, men like Butler and Carpenter, to whom Grant had 
given the right to distribute local federal patronage jobs, opposed the commission, even though 
Grant himself seemed genuinely interested in seeing it succeed. 
In the Senate, Carpenter’s main defense of the patronage system rested on its 
constitutionality, but he also made class-based arguments similar to the ones he used in support 
of the salary increase.  He attacked the use of competitive exams as a means of selecting civil 
servants, arguing that “reform” would replace the current political appointee, who was often a 
                                                 
23 Hoogenboom’s (1961: 20) description of the civil service reformers mirrors our earlier 
description of the Liberal Reformers: “Most of them were lawyers, editors, clergymen, 
professors, and businessmen whose interests were mercantile and financial rather than industrial. 
The typical reformer came from an old-established New England family and was a descendant of 
merchants, clergymen, and public servants. He inherited wealth and consequently deplored the 
crass materialism of the new rich whose prominence, based on vast fortunes, eclipsed his own. 
The typical reformer was either an Episcopalian or a Unitarian and was a Harvard graduate.”    22 
successful entrepreneur and had an understanding of business and practical knowledge of the 
world, with “the dunce who has been crammed up to a diploma at Yale.”  By adopting civil 
service reform, the entrepreneurs “are all to be disenfranchised. Energy, activity, perseverance, 
integrity, all the qualities that have secured their success in their own paths of life, are to be put 
aside if they happen to lack those early advantages which only the sons of the rich can enjoy” 
(Congressional Globe, Appendix, 42-2, 1/18/1872, p. 458). 
In the House, Butler led the charge against civil service reform.  His arguments focused 
on logical flaws in the proposed reforms and the strengths of the current patronage-based system.  
Two opportunities to vote on civil service reform emerged in the 42nd House.  The first was an 
amendment (RC 246) introduced by Butler to cut expenditures on the Civil Service Commission 
from $50,000 to $10,000.  Passage of the amendment would effectively emasculate the 
commission, as it would possess far fewer resources to develop a reform agenda.  It passed 115-
59, Republicans voting 66-47 and Democrats voting 49-12 (Congressional Globe, 42-2, 
4/12/1872, p. 2398).  The second was a motion (RC 252) by Butler to recommit a bill to turn 
some of the recommendations of the Civil Service Commission into law.
24  Voting “yea” on this 
motion would effectively kill the bill and hamstring the progress of civil service reform.  It 
passed 97-79, Republicans voting 75-35 and Democrats voting 22-44 (Congressional Globe, 42-
2, 4/19/1872, p. 2585). 
Since Liberal Reformers generated the initial impetus for civil service reform and 
Stalwarts opposed it, comparing vote choices on the congressional salary increase and civil 
service reform should provide some insight as to whether these factions were consistently at odds 
                                                 
24 More specifically, the crux of RC 252 was to recommit H.R. 787, a bill providing for the 
independence of the several departments of the government, without instructions.  In legislative 
parlance, a motion to recommit without instructions is a not-so-veiled attempt to kill a bill.   23 
in the 42nd Congress.  If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect there to be similar voting 
patterns, particularly among Republicans.  Democrats, on the other hand, may have been 
motivated to vote for civil service reform for pragmatic reasons, as they were the “out party” and 
thus not receiving federal patronage to distribute.  By supporting civil service reform, they may 
have felt that they could weaken the Republicans’ stranglehold on government.   
The results are shown in Tables 1-3.  We compare the votes of members who voted on 
both the motion to recommit civil service reform (RC 252) and the motion to table the 
congressional salary increase (RC 508).  
 
Table 1: Civil Service Reform and Salary Grab Votes, All Members 
    Table Salary Increase 
    Yes  No  Total 
Yes  17  58  75 
No  35  18  53  Recommit Civil 
Service Reform 
Total  52  76  128 
 
 
Table 2: Civil Service Reform and Salary Grab Votes, House Republicans Only 
    Table Salary Increase 
    Yes  No  Total 
Yes  14  45  59 
No  24  3  27 
Recommit Civil 
Service Reform 
Total  38  48  86 
 
 
Table 3: Civil Service Reform and Salary Grab Votes, House Democrats Only 
    Table Salary Increase 
    Yes  No  Total 
Yes  3  13  16 
No  11  15  26 
Recommit Civil 
Service Reform 
Total  14  28  42 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, of the 128 members who voted on both measures 93 (73 percent) 
switched their votes between civil service reform and the salary increase.  Breaking this result 
down by party, 24 of the 42 Democrats (57 percent) and 69 of the 86 Republicans (80 percent)   24 
switched their votes between the two measures.  This pattern of voting indicates that, particularly 
for Republicans, the salary increase and civil service reform were viewed as similar issues.  Both 
issues influenced the balance of power at the federal level by altering the pool of potential 
legislators and administrators.  Reformers, or those who wished to change the status quo, voted 
“yea” on the motion to table to the salary increase and “nay” on the motion to recommit civil 
service reform.  Stalwarts, or those who wanted to maintain the status quo, voted “nay” on the 




The franking privilege was another topic that led to accusations of corruption and was 
legislated on in the 42nd Congress.  Franking allowed members of Congress to “inform their 
constituents” by sending material through the mail free of charge.  The abuses of the franking 
privilege were criticized frequently, earning special notice by Twain and Warner (2002: 261) in a 
story told by Hicks to Colonel Sellers: 
Well Senator Balloon put fifteen cents worth of stamps on each of those seven 
huge boxes of old clothes, and shipped that ton of second-hand rubbish, old boots 
and pantaloons and what not through the mails as registered matter! It was an 
ingenious thing and it had a genuine touch of humor about it, too. I think there is 
more real talent among our public men of today than there was among those of 
old times—a far more fertile fancy, a much happier ingenuity. Now, Colonel, can 
you picture Jefferson, or Washington or John Adams franking their wardrobes 
through the mails and adding the facetious idea of making the government 
responsible for the cargo for the sum of one dollar and five cents? Statesmen were 




While this story may have been an exaggeration, similar rumors – such as the member 
who sent his horse home through the mail – abounded, and claims of franking abuses captured 
                                                 
25 According to French (1965: 135), Senator Balloon was modeled after James Nye (R-NV).   25 
the public interest.
26  The Stalwarts defended franking by arguing that it was the best means by 
which a member could stay in contact with his constituents.  In the 41st Congress, Carpenter 
assailed the press, arguing that it wanted to abolish franking so that it would be the only source 
of news.  By eliminating members’ ability to respond to press attacks, Carpenter claimed that:  
[a] few of the wealthiest newspaper establishments in the country, who maintain 
correspondents here, will have it in their power to break any man, and to create 
just such public sentiment on any question as may promote their interest; and a 
system of favoritism and corruption will thus be inaugurated which will paralyze 
independent, individual action in Congress, and mislead the public mind, 
whenever it is for the interest of a few to do so.   
 
Carpenter continued with his now-familiar attack on privilege, arguing that the elimination of 
franking would favor certain members of Congress and disempower others:  “It is true, that a 
Senator who possesses wealth may set himself right with his constituents; but all others must 
fold their hands and submit to their fate” (Congressional Globe, 41-2, 6/15/1870, pp. 502-503). 
Butler took up Carpenter’s argument early in the 42nd Congress, arguing that the 
“metropolitan press” sought to end franking so that it could “crush down every local newspaper 
that now goes free” (Congressional Globe, 42-2, 4/2/1872, p. 458).  After a long debate and 
months of delay, the motion to eliminate the franking privilege was finally brought to a vote in 
the lame-duck session of the 42nd Congress.  In the wake of the Crédit Mobilier scandal, 
opponents of the measure, like Butler and Carpenter, could delay action no longer, and the 
franking privilege was abolished 144-48, Republicans voting 84-26 and Democrats voting 60-22 
(Congressional Globe, 42-3, 1/27/1873, p. 93).
27   
                                                 
26 Additional “franked” items discussed in news coverage of the time included flower pots, 
plants, shrubs, and bouquets from the Congressional Public Gardens (Townsend 1873: 510-12). 
27 This “victory for reform” would prove to be fleeting.  The franking privilege was partially 
reinstituted in the 43rd Congress, and gradually broadened until it was fully reinstituted in the 
51st Congress (Pontius 1995).   26 
Tables 4-6 provide a comparison of the votes of members who voted on both the motion 
to eliminate the franking privilege (RC 423) and the motion to table the Salary Grab (RC 508).   
 
Table 4: Franking and Salary Grab Votes, All Members 
    Table Salary Increase 
    Yes  No  Total 
Yes  59  45  104 
No  3  32  35 
Eliminate 
Franking 
Total  62  77  139 
 
Table 5: Franking and Salary Grab Votes, House Republicans Only 
    Table Salary Increase 
    Yes  No  Total 
Yes  44  24  68 
No  2  19  21  Eliminate 
Franking 
Total  46  43  89 
 
Table 6: Franking and Salary Grab Votes, House Democrats Only 
    Table Salary Increase 
    Yes  No  Total 
Yes  15  21  36 
No  1  13  14  Eliminate 
Franking 
Total  16  34  50 
 
 
As shown in Table 4, of the 62 members who voted on both measures and supported 
tabling the salary increase, only three – two Republicans and one Democrat – opposed 
eliminating franking.  Breaking the results down by party, as shown in Tables 5 and 6, we find 
that Democrats and Republicans voted similarly on the two issues.  However, looking closer, we 
find that Republicans who voted to eliminate franking were almost twice as likely to support 
tabling the salary increase, while those Democrats who voted to eliminate franking were more 
likely to oppose tabling the salary increase.  The Republican result reveals a core group of liberal 
reformers in that party.  This vote comparison, like the vote on civil service reform, indicates that 
two opposing groups battled over “reform” issues.  Those issues affected who could serve in the 
federal government either as a member of Congress or as a civil servant.    27 
V. Regression Analyses of the Salary Grab 
 
In this section, we pursue a more systematic set of analyses in our search for coalitions 
battling over the issue of “who should govern” in the 42nd House.  In the regressions that follow, 
we incorporate several explanatory variables.  To isolate traits that distinguish between Liberal 
Reformers and Stalwarts, we include measures of education, wealth, military service, and 
whether the member of Congress represented his birth state.  Education ranges from 0 to 3 and 
is equal to secondary + college, where secondary takes on the value of 1 if the member went to a 
private secondary school and zero otherwise, while college takes on the value of 0 for no college, 
2 if the college was either Ivy League or had a Phi Beta Kappa chapter, and 1 otherwise.  Wealth 
measures a member’s real and personal wealth as reported in the 1870 Census.
28  Military is 
equal to 1 if the member served in the military at any level, 0 otherwise.  Birth State is equal to 
1 if the member served the state in which he was born, 0 otherwise.  We also include covariates 
to control for factors emphasized in the historical literature.  Party is equal to 1 if the member 
was a Democrat and 0 if Republican.  Lame Duck is coded 1 if the member was exiting 
Congress, 0 otherwise.  We also include a set of dummy variables – West-Midwest, Mid 
Atlantic, and South – to tap potential regional influences on member vote choice.
29 
We predict that members with greater levels of elite education are more likely to vote 
against the Salary Grab.  Education level should capture an important trait associated with the 
Liberal Reformers.  We also predict that members with greater wealth will vote against the Grab.  
                                                 
28 Joseph Ferrie supplied us with the majority of the observations on wealth from the 1870 
Census. Those members of Congress who had no wealth reported were keyed in as a zero if 
wealth was reported for any other individual on that Census page.  The observation was dropped 
if wealth was not reported for any other individual on that Census page.  In this, we followed the 
suggestion of Ferrie.  We supplemented the data from Ferrie with additional Census data 
assembled by Terry Seip.  For more on the latter, see Seip (1983). 
29 New England thus represents the omitted category.   28 
Two separate factors might drive this prediction: 1) members with greater wealth may have a 
lower marginal utility of money; and 2) members with greater wealth were more likely to be 
members of the “elite” class and thus would want to shape the membership of Congress by 
keeping salaries low.  The importance of the second factor is diminished because opponents of 
the Liberal Reformers often had quite a bit of wealth.  (That wealth, however, was not inherited; 
our ideal measure, therefore, would be inherited wealth, which is unavailable).  We also predict 
that members with a military background and those who have moved away from their home 
states would be less likely to be among the elite class of reformers. 
Conflated slightly with the measures of wealth, education, military experience, and birth 
state is region.  The reformer sentiment originated in New England and the Midwest, regions 
from which members were considerably wealthier relative to members from the South.  This is 
illustrated in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Demographic Characteristics of House Members, by Region 
 







Mean  44,619  65,622  71,778  64,179  Wealth 
Median  12,375  30,000  27,000  15,000 
Mean  1.1  1.1  1.6  0.95  Education Index 
Median  1  1  2  1 
Mean  0.56  0.20  0.22  0.44  Military 
Median  1  0  0  0 
Mean  0.57  0.76  0.71  0.29  Birth State 
Median  1  1  1  0 
  Count  67  59  27  77 
 
At the same time, New Englanders and Midwesterners did not form a single, homogeneous 
group.  New Englanders were more likely to have an elite education than members from any   29 
other region.  Midwesterners were roughly twice as likely as New Englanders to have served in 
the military and to have moved away from their state of birth.
30   
In contrast to the reformers, the advocates of maintaining the status quo – the patronage-
based party politics of the time – resided mainly in the Mid Atlantic and South.  This Mid-
Atlantic/South coalition traced its origins back to the early days of the Republic, when an 
interregional coalition, centered on a New York-Virginia alliance, was built to control national 
politics.  This Mid-Atlantic/South alliance grew stronger over time, reaching maturation during 
the Democrat-Whig battles of the 1830s and 1840s.  And while members from these regions 
were fairly heterogeneous – those from the Mid Atlantic having considerable wealth, while those 
from the South having considerable military experience, for example – their careers were based 
on a common “investment” in the moors of nineteenth-century machine politics.  Thus, we 
predict that members from the Mid Atlantic and South would likely fight efforts to reform the 
nature of the governing structure. 
For our regression analysis we chose RC 508, the motion to table the Salary Grab, which 
was defeated 66-105.
31  If this motion had passed, the debate over raising congressional salaries 
would have ended.  Table 8 reports the results of a logit regression on RC 508.   
                                                 
30 Another difference between New England and the Midwest was the existence of strong third-
party agrarian movements in the Midwest.  While McGuire (1981) ties the rise of agrarian unrest 
to rising agricultural uncertainty, the Patrons of Husbandry, which rose to its peak in the mid 
1870s, also pushed a clean government platform.  See Sanders (1999: 105-108) for the political 
platform of the Grange.  We test for the impact of this agrarian movement on Salary Grab voting 
by including the number of Granges per 100,000 agricultural population in 1875 as an 
explanatory variable in our regression.  Because the coefficient does not have the predicted sign; 
is not statistically significant; and does not affect the coefficients on our other variables, we 
choose not to report the results here. 
31 The results from estimates of the other seven Salary Grab votes give similar results.  We ran 
these additional seven regressions using the same independent variables as in Table 8.  In all 
cases, the regression coefficients have the expected sign.  The Education variable is significant in 
five, the Wealth in one, the Birth State in six, and the Military in all seven regressions at the ten   30 
Table 8: Vote to Table the Salary Grab (RC 508) 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust SE  z-Statistic  p-value  DProb 
Constant  0.364  0.712  0.51  0.609   
Education  0.623  0.198  3.14  0.002  16.1% 
Wealth  1.73E-06  8.81E-07  1.96  0.050  5.8% 
Military  -1.120  0.430  -2.79  0.005  -27.4% 
Birth State  1.088  0.488  2.23  0.026  14.8% 
Lame Duck  -0.264  0.439  -0.60  0.548  -5.2% 
Party  -0.481  0.456  -1.05  0.292  -10.0% 
West-Midwest  -0.576  0.725  -0.79  0.427  -12.2% 
Mid Atlantic  -2.796  0.796  -3.51  0.000  -59.6% 
South  -2.221  0.784  -2.83  0.005  -50.4% 
Wald ￿
2 (9 df)  32.99   Pseudo R-squared  0.244   
N = 156        
 
  Estimated Equation 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total 
P(Dep=1)<=.5  82  22  104 
P(Dep=1)>.5  12  40  52 
Total  94  62  156 
% Correctly Predicted  87.23  64.52  78.21 
 
 
Our measures of elite interests – wealth, education, military experience, and state of birth 
– all have the predicted signs and matter.
32  The measures that most closely measure the 
explanations of historians for the Salary Grab – party and lame duck – prove not to be important.  
  To understand the economic importance of our measures we constructed a baseline 
probability of voting to table (kill) the Salary Grab.  For our initial baseline we set wealth equal 
to the mean of all members of Congress,
33 the education variable equal to 1, and the dummy 
variables for a non-lame-duck Northeastern Republican who has no military service and does not 
represent his state of birth.  For a member with this set of characteristics the probability of voting 
to table the Salary Grab is 75.3 percent.  A one standard deviation change in wealth increases the 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent level. We also created an index of all salary grab votes, ran the same econometric model, 
and uncovered the same results.  In short, the estimates for the RC 508 analysis are robust.  
32 Members voting to table the motion had twice as much wealth on average as those voting to 
sustain it.  
33 The mean of the wealth variable is $73,585, and its standard deviation is $196,585.    31 
probability of voting to table the Grab by 5.8 percentage points.  A change in education from a 
private high school degree to an elite college increases the probability by 16.1 percentage points.  
Having prior military service reduces the probability by 27.4 percentage points, while 
representing one’s birth state increases the probability by 14.8 percentage points.  The Mid 
Atlantic and South dummies also matter and in a sensible way, reducing the probability by 59.6 
and 50.4 percentage points, respectively.  Overall, the results indicate that a non-party coalition 
existed that was regionally based, and at least a part of which consisted of a social elite that was 
wealthier, better educated, and more deeply rooted than the average.
34 
We also estimated the probability of tabling the Salary Grab (RC 508) using the roll calls 
on killing civil service reform (RC 252) and abolishing franking (RC 423) as explanatory 
variables.  The results of this logit regression are reported in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: Vote to Table the Salary Grab (RC 508) 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust SE  z-Statistic  p-value  DProb 
Constant  -1.259  0.806  -1.56  0.118   
Kill Civil Service Reform  -1.749  0.481  -3.64  0.000  -17.4% 
Abolish Franking  2.481  0.817  3.04  0.002  55.1% 
Wald ￿
2 (2 df)  21.16  Pseudo R-squared  0.250   
N = 102         
 
  Estimated Equation 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total 
P(Dep=1)<=.5  46  16  62 
P(Dep=1)>.5  9  31  40 
Total  55  47  102 
% Correctly Predicted  83.64  65.96  75.49 
                                                 
34 Poole and Rosenthal’s (1991, 1997) two-dimensional NOMINATE mapping of congressional 
voting provides another piece of evidence that the Salary Grab was not a party issue.  Across 
time, on a Congress-by-Congress basis, NOMINATE uncovers a single underlying dimension, 
which typically divides along party lines, that explains roughly 80 to 85 percent of individual 
roll-call vote choices.  A second NOMINATE dimension typically explains additional variance 
by measuring cross-cutting cleavages, i.e., issues that divide the parties.  For the eight Salary 
Grab votes, the first dimension provides virtually no explanatory power; however, all eight votes 
are in the top ten in terms of most-important second dimension votes.   32 
 
 
As these results indicate, members’ vote choices on the motions to kill civil service reform and 
abolish franking do an excellent job of predicting their vote choices to table the Salary Grab: 
voting to kill civil service lowers the probability of voting to table the Salary Grab, while voting 
to abolish franking increases the probability of voting to table the Salary Grab.  In Table 10, we 
estimate the predicted probability of voting to table the Salary Grab, contingent on voting on the 
motions to kill civil service reform and abolish franking. 
 
Table 10: Predicted Probability of Voting to Table the Salary Grab (RC 508) 
    Eliminate Franking 
    Yes  No 
Yes  37.1%  4.7%  Kill Civil 
Service Reform  No  77.2%  22.1% 
 
 
If a member voted to preserve franking and kill civil service reform, there was a predicted 
4.7 percent probability that he would vote to table (kill) the Salary Grab.  Whereas, if a member 
voted to eliminate franking and preserve civil service reform, there was a predicted 77.2 percent 
probability that he would vote to table (kill) the Salary Grab.  These results support our argument 
that a consistent ideological “current” permeated vote choice in the 42nd Congress, that is, 
opposing the Salary Grab, supporting civil service reform, and supporting the elimination of 
franking went hand-in-hand-in-hand as measures affecting “who should govern.”  
 Finally, we examine whether our covariates pick up a consistent pattern of voting on all 
three issues affecting governance and the access to power.  We attempt to capture a systematic 
ideology by creating an index that ranges from -3 to 3.  To be included in the index, a member 
had to have voted on all three measures.  A member received a 1 for each vote in favor of 
“reform” – opposing the Salary Grab, supporting civil service reform, and supporting the   33 
abolition of franking – and a -1 for each vote against “reform.”  Table 11 reports the results from 
an OLS regression,
35 using the same independent variables as in Table 8.
36   
As in the Salary Grab estimation, we find evidence that wealth, birth state, and region 
(West-Midwest, Mid Atlantic, and South) mattered for voting across the three “reform” issues.  
Education is also in the expected direction, but the coefficient is weaker in reliability.
37  In sum, 
these results suggest that the same underlying factors predicted voting on the Salary Grab, 
franking, and civil service reform. 
 
Table 11: Index of Reform 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust SE  z-Statistic  p-value 
Constant  1.263  0.607  2.08  0.041 
Education  0.302  0.209  1.45  0.152 
Wealth  6.89E-06  3.62E-06  1.90  0.060 
Military  -0.305  0.475  -0.64  0.522 
Birth State  0.920  0.420  2.19  0.031 
Party  0.372  0.531  0.70  0.485 
West-Midwest  -1.357  0.593  -2.29  0.025 
Mid Atlantic  -2.735  0.597  -4.58  0.000 
South  -3.142  0.725  -4.34  0.000 
F (8 df)  8.21   R-squared  0.286 
N = 91      
 
In terms of our regression analyses overall, we find substantial statistical evidence that a 
battle over “who should govern” occurred in the 42nd Congress.  A group of members who 
believed strongly that Congress and the federal government ought to be run by the “best men” 
coalesced around a set of issues like opposition to the Salary Grab, the abolition of franking, and 
                                                 
35 We also ran an ordered logit.  Similar results were obtained. 
36 The only exception is the lame duck variable, which is not included because the vote on civil 
service reform occurred in the “regular” session of Congress, not in the “lame duck” session.  
Thus, including a lame duck variable would lead to measurement error in the estimation.
 
37 We also ran a separate regression on all members who voted on at least 2 of the 3 measures 
(N=183).  The results were similar, with only the West-Midwest variable losing statistical 
significance.
   34 
the furtherance of a merit-based civil service.  Our measures roughly capture this movement, but 
they are clearly not perfect.  For example, Butler, the ultimate opportunist who sponsored the 
Salary Grab, was from New England, college educated, and one of the wealthiest members of 
Congress.  In short, creating a strong proxy for Liberal Reformers is difficult.  Nevertheless, we 
find a strong connection between wealth, education, military service, and birth state and support 
for measures that influenced access to power in congressional voting. 
 
VI. Discussion 
In this paper, we argued that a reform coalition emerged in the 42nd Congress, 
responding to the growing public unease surrounding charges of graft and corruption associated 
with the Grant Administration.  The reformers, composed of New England and Midwestern 
elites, believed that the patronage-based machine politics that came to dominate the Republican 
Party after the Civil War were unacceptable.  These reformers supported a philosophy of “good 
government” wherein the “best men” would comprise public servants, specifically men from 
privileged backgrounds who would act selflessly, strive for efficiency, and promote the greater 
good.  Growing weary of the Republican Party, the liberal reformers attempted to start their own 
party, the Liberal Republican Party, to challenge Grant and his associates in 1872.  This proved 
to be a failure, however, as the liberals found it difficult to organize effectively, and Grant was 
reelected by a sizeable margin. 
Yet, this liberal reform wave produced indirect benefits.  First, a public awareness for 
“reform” was created, thanks in part to the growth of a liberal group of editorialists and media 
outlets after the Civil War.  As charges of graft and corruption emerged as “good media copy,” 
constituent monitoring of public officials increased, and politicians responded by (occasionally) 
toning down their antics.  Second, the liberal reformers were successful in placing “reform” on   35 
the political agenda.  While the 1872 campaign indicated that issues involving access to power, 
by themselves, could not drive the political process, they could help define the terms of partisan 
debate.  In effect, the liberal reformers were able to get “reform” a place at the partisan table, not 
only with within the Republican Party but within the Democratic Party as well.  For example, the 
Democrats tried to take advantage of the corruption charges surrounding Grant’s Administration 
by nominating Samuel Tilden (N.Y.) for president in 1876, in large part because of his successful 
dismantling of the Tweed Ring while serving as Chairman of the New York Democratic Party.
38  
The Republicans, to keep pace, turned to moderate reformers, like Rutherford Hayes (Oh.) in 
1876 and James Garfield (Oh.) in 1880, with their presidential nominations. 
This “good government” coalition lived on, not as a separate political organization, but as 
an ideological movement.  By creating a political consciousness for reform, the New England 
and Midwestern elites ensured that issues aimed at reducing the power of urban-based party 
machines would remain on the political agenda, even if their initial coalition did not survive.  
And this is exactly what occurred.  As detailed earlier, while the Salary Grab was rescinded in 
the 43rd Congress, the franking privilege was reinstituted and civil service reform stalled.  Yet, 
pressure for reform continued, and eventually a significant restructuring of the civil service 
system (the Pendleton Act) passed in 1883,
39 and the first independent federal agency, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, was created in 1887.  Additional reform efforts were made at 
                                                 
38 See Ackerman (2005) for a discussion of the Tweed Ring and Tilden’s role as prosecutor. 
39 Hayes made small steps toward dismantling partisan machine politics by regaining control 
over executive-based patronage appointments, which during the past two decades had become 
controlled by powerful Senators in the Republican Party.  Hayes took on the machine in New 
York State and scored successful victories.  Garfield followed in Hayes’ footsteps by effectively 
destroying the Stalwart wing of the Republican Party and working toward a system of merit-
based patronage.  But the biggest boost for civil service reform came with Garfield’s 
assassination by a disgruntled office seeker.  This was the leverage reformers needed to spur 
Congress to pass the Pendleton Act in 1883.  See Morgan (1969) for a detailed discussion.   36 
the state level throughout the late-nineteenth century, chief among them was the adoption of the 
Australian ballot, a government ballot that made voting secret and facilitated split-ticket voting, 
thereby reducing the coercive abilities of the national parties (see, e.g., Fredman 1968).   
By the first decade of the twentieth century, a full-blown reform movement was 
underway – extending far beyond the initial anti-party reforms of the 1870s – led by the strong 
voice of President Theodore Roosevelt; this reform momentum would continue through the 
1910s, with Roosevelt’s mantle picked up by President Woodrow Wilson.  For example, in 
addition to social reforms, like the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), the Child Labor Act (1916), 
and the Adamson Act (1918), which established the eight-hour workday, the new Progressive 
Era produced political reforms such as congressional primaries (early 1910s), the direct election 
of Senators (1913), and the extension of suffrage to women (1920).  Over time, “reform” 
initiatives switched from being Republican initiatives – as the Republicans retrenched behind 
conservative candidates like William Howard Taft, Warren Harding, and Calvin Coolidge – to 
becoming one of the hallmarks of the Democratic Party, culminating in the New Deal agenda of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt.   
Our contention is that the political reforms in the late-nineteenth century and the rise of 
Progressive Era politics in the early-twentieth century trace their origins to the liberal reform 
efforts of the early-1870s.  While this movement failed initially in creating a true “reform party,” 
and had minimal success in expediting a broad reform agenda at the congressional level over 
“who should govern,” its emergence and perseverance put reform on the political map.  In 
identifying the rise of the Liberal Reformers – the civic-minded elites of New England and the 
Midwest – and their connection to the Progressive Movement, we also take the first step in a 
broader research agenda aimed at understanding the variety of interests that emerged to promote   37 
various “flavors” of reform during the Progressive Era.  The terms “progressive” and “reform” 
meant different things to different groups at different points in time during the half-century 
spanning 1870 to 1920.  This complexity often gets overlooked or glossed over in historical 
studies of Progressivism.  To truly understand how the Progressive Era developed, we argue that 
the key interests and their policy agendas throughout the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries must be carefully and clearly identified; only by doing so can we claim to have a firm 
grasp on the antecedents and evolution of Progressivism in the United States.    38 
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